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1 Introduction
The OECD countries as a whole spent 5.8 per cent of their collective GDP on
education in 2001, and 12.7 per cent of total public expenditure was devoted to
educational institutions1. Most of these countries oﬀer publicly financed primary and
secondary education, and in many countries tertiary education is also provided by the
state at no direct cost for the individual. Part of the justification for publicly funded
education is the positive eﬀects of education on the productivity of the country2.
The government encourages the individuals to get higher education, focusing on the
amount of human capital in society and to a great extent ignoring its composition.
Diﬀerent types of education yield diﬀerent rates of private and social return. It
therefor ought to be of great interest to the government to learn more about the
mechanisms determining the individual’s choice of educational direction, and not
only the amount of education. At the very least, one should be aware of which
kinds of distortions the income tax system imposes on the educational choice of the
individuals. Could it in fact be that the tax system induces the individual to choose
other kinds of education than it would in the absence of taxes?
The individual’s motivation for choosing higher education may be divided into
four categories. First, education is an investment that yields higher wages later in
life. Individuals invest in education until the expected marginal pecuniary return
equals that of other investment alternatives (Nerlove et.al 1993). Second, education
is a signal of high abilities of the individual and might correct for information prob-
lems in the labor market (Stiglitz 1975). Third, education is insurance against un-
employment (Bishop 1994). Fourth, education oﬀers non-pecuniary and non-market
types of return, both during the education itself and afterwards (Becker 1964, Lazear
1977). Among these are the joy of learning new things, meeting new people, moving
to a new city, enjoying the life as a student, in addition to the increased status in
the society that often comes with studying in particular fields. It is important to
remember that even if education is treated as homogenous in the literature, it is in
fact a heterogenous investment alternative and consumption good. Thus diﬀerent
kinds of education generate diﬀerent levels of joy or satisfaction during the educa-
tional process. Also, diﬀerent kinds of education require diﬀerent levels of eﬀort in
1OECD: Education at a Glance.
2See Lucas (1988).
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order to graduate, a factor the student also considers. After its completion, higher
education enables the individual to choose among more interesting jobs. Diﬀerent
educational types oﬀer diﬀerent degrees of flexibility regarding working hours and
the regional distribution of jobs. Individuals with strong preferences for where to
live or for being able to work part time will value these qualities strongly when
choosing type of education. Another feature that diﬀers among the diﬀerent educa-
tional directions is the eﬀort required by the student to complete the education, and
thus also the amount of leisure available to the student. Let all these non-market
and non-pecuniary types of return to education be summarized as the consumption
value of education. Depending on their preferences, individuals put diﬀerent weight
on the consumption value when choosing educational type3.
Fredriksson (1997) shows on Swedish data that the demand for education re-
sponds to economic incentives; more students enrolled at the universities in peri-
ods with high expected wage returns or with particularly beneficial student loans
arrangements. The link between the income tax system and the length of the indi-
vidual’s education is well studied in the literature. Higher education is considered as
an investment alternative in which the individual invests until the expected marginal
pecuniary return equals that of other investment alternatives. Taxes on financial in-
come increases the relative pecuniary return to education, and taxes on labor income
reduces the return to human capital investments (Boskin 1975, Heckman 1976). The
nature of the tax schedule also aﬀects the attractiveness of human capital invest-
ments. If no direct costs of acquiring education besides foregone labor income are
present, a proportional tax on labor income is a neutral tax on the return to human
capital investments. But if a positive tax on capital income exists as well, the com-
prehensive proportional income tax induces the individual to over-invest in human
capital (Nielsen and Sørensen 1997). This eﬀect is even stronger if education has a
positive consumption value as well (Alstadsæter 2003a). On the other hand, if edu-
cation requires direct pecuniary investments, a comprehensive proportional income
tax discriminates against human capital investments. (Trostel 1993).
Monetary return to the education no doubt is an important factor in the indi-
vidual’s educational choice, but it is a drawback for the explanatory power of the
economic models that the other motives behind the educational choice mostly are
3See Alstadsæter (2003b) for a thorough discussion of the consept of the consumption value of
education.
3
ignored. For instance is the Norwegian labor force among the most highly educated
in the OECD4, but still has a compressed wage structure and moderate wage return
to higher education. Where a country as the US at the present has an average wage
premium5 to an additional year of higher education of 10 %, the corresponding rate
in Norway is 5,5 %. This is the average wage return over all kinds of education at
the same duration. But diﬀerent types of education do in fact generate diﬀerent
rates of wage return, even if they have the same duration. As shown by Moen and
Semmingsen (1996), some kinds of higher education have negative wage return in
Norway compared with having only high school. Still the number of students at
universities and regional colleges has more than doubled over the last 20 years6. It
thus seems like the students are willing to forego future pecuniary return in order
to get the non-pecuniary return to the educational type of their choice.
The educational choice of today’s young generation determines the skill compo-
sition and hence the production possibilities of tomorrow’s labor force. Small open
economies with high wage levels, as many of the European countries, experience a
flagging-out of their industrial production to low-cost countries. A consensus exists
in these countries that the future economic growth depends on their abilities to
transfer into knowledge-based industries and innovation production. In order to do
this, a highly educated labor force with the required skill combination is essential.
Little attention has been given the link between the country’s income tax system
and the individual’s choice of educational direction. If it is so that the tax system
not only aﬀects how much education the individuals choose to get, but also which
kind of education they choose, then the tax system indeed aﬀects future production
possibilities.
This paper analyzes how the individual’s trade-oﬀ between pecuniary and non-
pecuniary return in his choice of educational type is aﬀected by the tax system.
Depending on the individual’s preferences, a progressive tax system might in fact
introduce distortions in the individuals’s educational choice and induce him to choose
more of the educational type with the higher consumption value. If he also puts more
weight on the present than on the future, this eﬀect is strengthened further. Section
2 presents the model, the analysis is done in section 3, section 4 presents empirical
4OECD: Education at a glance.
5Source: Psacharopoulos and Patrinos, 2002.
6Hægeland and Møen (2000)
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evidence, and section 5 concludes.
2 The model
The representative individual lives for two periods. He already has decided to spend
all available time in the first period on acquiring education and getting a bachelor’s
degree at university level. The remaining decision to make is which subjects to choose
for the degree. By modelling the educational choice in this simplified manner, I focus
on the choice of educational type and abstract from the decision whether or not to
get education in the first place7.
Consider the extreme case where the wage return is either low or high, and
where the consumption value of the educational type is either low or high. The four
diﬀerent combinations of the educational attributes are:.
Type-A education: High consumption value and low wage return.
Type-B education: Low consumption value and high wage return.
Type-R education: High consumption value and high wage return.
Type-S education: Low consumption value and low wage return.
No rational individual would choose type-S education, since he is much better
oﬀ by choosing one of the other three alternatives. This educational alternative may
hence safely be disregarded in the analysis. In this setting, all individuals would
choose type-R education, since this oﬀers both high consumption value and high
future wages. If this was true in a perfect competitive educational market, all indi-
viduals would choose this type of education, and the whole skilled labor force would
have identical qualifications. Assume that type-R is an education with restricted
admission, as the case is for among others for most business schools and medical
schools. Then only a selected sample of the individuals may consume this very ad-
vantageous education. The following analysis focuses on the educational choice of
7A more general and realistic specification would be to allow the individual to choose in the
first period how much of his time to spend on getting education, on labour, and on leisure. In this
paper I simplify by assuming that the choices of how much and which kind of education to acquire
are separarble. This is analog to the litterature on saving and portfolio choice, where the savings
decision is analyzed separatelly from the protfolio choice.
5
the individual when perfect competition exists in the educational sector. Both type-
A and type-B education have free admission, and the following model analyzes how
taxes aﬀect the individual’s choice between these two kinds of education. In the
following, consider the extreme case where the consumption value of type-A edu-
cation is positive, while the consumption value of type-B education is negative. So
no rational individual chooses type-B education unless he is compensated for the
negative consumption value in some way or another. Let the wage return to type-
B education compared with getting type-A education be positive. If the individual
chooses to get type-A education he puts more weight on the non-pecuniary return
to the education and foregoes other consumption since his income is lower than it
would have been had he chosen type-B education.
The individual chooses the optimal linear combination of the two types of ed-
ucation, A and B, in the first period. The parameters EA and EB denominate the
fraction of available time spent on type-A and type-B education, respectively. These
fractions are restricted to be between zero and one, and they sum to one8:
EA +EB = 1. (1)
and
EA ∈ h0, 1i , EB ∈ h0, 1i .
By combining the two educational directions, A and B, in diﬀerent manners, the
individual has a continuum of diﬀerent kinds of bachelor degrees to choose from.
Normally one considers the educational choice to be discrete, in which the individ-
ual would have to choose either type-A or type-B education, as is the fact in the
previously described type R education. In this paper the educational choice is con-
tinous, in which the individual may choose to combine the two kinds of education
as he wishes.
The model is competitive where the solution to be described later is the partial
equilibrium solution in a competitive model. This puts restrictions on the analysis,
and among them the most important one is that no supply eﬀects are considered.
Educational institutions mostly have a limited supply of student places within each
program, and popular programs introduce admission restrictions. This eﬀect is ab-
sent in this model. As long as the individual wishes to acquire more of one type of
education, he may do so.
8This sum has no particular significance in this model, since the unit of measurement is arbitrary.
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The first and second period are not restricted to have the same duration, and so
the second period may be much longer than the first period. Most people do spend
more of their lifetime working then they do getting education. The individual is
also assumed stay in the same job for the whole second period. This is the extreme
version of the lock-in eﬀect that to some extent exists in the labour market; the
individual has full freedom in his choice of educational type, but he has limited
possibility to change this choice after the completion of the education9. Since his
pre-education qualifications determine for which jobs he qualifies, he has a limited
range of jobs to choose from. The time spent working, H, is given in the second
period and independent of the educational profile chosen in the first period. Seeing
that type-B education leads to a stressful and less enjoyable job that pays better
than the alternative, one might also expect that a job requiring type-B qualifications
would demand longer hours. That aspect is not considered here. Hence the duration
of the second period and the hours worked are independent of the educational profile.
In each period the consumer gets utility from ordinary consumption and educa-
tion. Education is both a consumption good and an investment alternative. Type A
education yields a direct utility gain in the first period because of the advantageous
nature of the education. On the other hand, type-B education generates a direct util-
ity loss because it both is a tiring educational process, and because the job it qualifies
for has many negative characteristics. At the same time, the educational choice also
aﬀects the bundle of goods the individual may consume in the two periods, C1 and
C2. Type B education increases the individual’s consumption possibilities compared
with type-A education. The individual’s preferences are represented by the utility
function
U = U(C1, C2, EA). (2)
Utility is increasing in all three consumption goods, C1, C2, and EA. First and
second period consumption are both assumed to be normal goods, and so is type-A
education. It follows from equations (1) and (2) that U(C1, C2, EA) = U(C1, C2, 1−
EB), and hence the marginal utility of type-B education is negative.
A bachelor’s degree yield the expected wage return w, where the probability of
future unemployment is accounted for. Let type-A education generate zero addi-
9This is an analogy to the putty-clay hypothesis in production theory (Johansen, 1972), where
there ex-ante is full substitution between labor and capital, while the ex-post production coeﬃcients
are given when the capital is installed.
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tional wage return in the second period, such that the individual’s total expected
wage in the second period by investing EA units in type-A education in the first
period is given by w · EA · H. Type B education generates an additional propor-
tional10 expected wage return e, and the expected second period wage is hence
given by (w + e) ·EB ·H. Diﬀerent types of education have diﬀerent probabilities for
future unemployment, and this aﬀects the expected wage return to education. E.g.,
a high probability of unemployment for individuals with type-A qualifications and
less probability of unemployment for individuals with type-B qualifications would
imply a large diﬀerence in the expected marginal wage returns to the two kinds of
education, whit a low w and a high e.
No tuition fees are paid, but the individual needs to finance his living expenses in
the first period. He borrows money in the financial market at a given interest rate r.
In the absence of liquidity constraints, he finances all his first period consumption,
C1 , through debt, D. All debt is paid back in the second period11. There exist no
non-labor income or intergenerational transfers in the model. His first period budget
constraint is hence given by:
C1 = D. (3)
The time spent working in the second period, H, is exogenously given and inde-
pendent of the educational profile. Second period consumption, C2, depends crucially
on the chosen educational profile. The basic expected w is paid to the individual on
all hours he works, independent of his skills. The basic wage is taxed at the rate tw.
In addition, the individual receives a positive wage return e proportional to all units
of type-B education he underwent in the first period. This additional wage return
to education is also taxed at the basic tax rate tw, but in addition a surtax of te
applies. His second period consumption is hence given by:
C2 = [1− tw] · w ·EA ·H + [1− tw] · w · EB ·H (4)
+ [1− (tw + te)] · e ·EB ·H − [1 + r] ·D,
10An alternative is to model the marginal return as a positive and decreasing function of the
time spent on type B education, k(EB), but as the proportional return to education is the simplest
way to illustrate our point, that is the method chosen for this paper.
11This two-period model simplifies reality a great deal. It actually means that the individual gets
paid in advance, at the beginning of the period, such as to be able to pay back the debt he issued
to finance his living expenses in the first period.
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If te = 0, tax on labour income is proportional, and if te > 0, tax on labour income
is progressive. Obviously, if tw = te = 0, there is no tax on labour income. Both
tax rates are restricted to be larger than or equal to zero, and smaller than one.
Regressive income taxation is no option here. r is the exogenously determined net
interest rate. A change in the tax rates on labor income hence leaves the tax rate
on capital income unaﬀected12. Thus the net interest rate and the discount factor
are unaﬀected by the tax on labor income. By combining the equations (3) and
(4), we find the individual’s life time budget constraint where type-A education is a
consumption good for which the individual is willing to pay:
C1 +
1
1 + r
· C2 + [1− tw − te] · e ·H
1 + r
· EA = [1− tw] · [w + e]− te · e
1 + r
·H. (5)
The right hand side of (5) represents the individual’s full income, which is the
maximum achievable income had he chosen only type-B education. The left hand
side is the diﬀerent kinds of consumption. Type A education is now explicitly viewed
as a consumption good with a well defined price, namely the present value of the
marginal wage premium by choosing the alternative type-B education. The price
of one additional unit of this type-A education is the income he gives up by not
choosing type-B education. Denote this alternative price of type-A education as
pA :
pA ≡
[1− tw − te] · e ·H
1 + r
. (6)
The presence of both basic labor income tax, tw, and the surtax te reduces the price
of type-A education as a consumption good, and the substitution eﬀect of taxes
induces the individual to get more type-A and less type-B education. This eﬀect is
even stronger the higher these tax rates are. The individual makes his consumption
and investment decisions for the whole of his life span in the first period. The higher
his discount rate is, the more weight he puts on the present and less on the future.
That is, the higher the net interest rate r is, the more first period consumption
matters relative to second period consumption, and the more type-A education he
chooses to consume. The opposite is the result the higher the wage return to type-B
education, e, is or the longer the duration of his second period working life, H, is.
12This corresponds to the Scandinavian system of dual income taxation, where tax rates on
labour and capital income are set separately.
9
Then the substitution eﬀect induces the individual to choose less type-A education.
Even if the income taxes reduce the price of type-A education as a consumption
good, they also reduces total net income. This negative income eﬀect would induce
the individual to consume less of all goods, including type-A education. The total
eﬀect of the taxes on the individual’s educational choice is found in the next chapter.
This is a partial model that only investigates the individual’s educational deci-
sion, and hence the governmental budget constraint is disregarded.
3 The tax analysis.
3.1 The eﬀect of income tax on the educational choice.
In the following, let the prices of first and second period consumption be
p1 ≡ 1, (7)
p2 ≡
1
1 + r
. (8)
This allows us to define the price vector p = (p1, p2, pA). Also, let the individual’s
full income be defined as y :
y ≡ [1− tw] · [w + e]− te · e
1 + r
·H. (9)
Applying this new notation reduces the individual’s life time budget constraint (5)
to p1C1+ p2C2+ pAEA = y. This new notation simplifies the following development
of the response function to a tax change in our particular case.
The individual maximizes his utility under the restriction that his lifetime budget
constraint must bind. Manipulating the first order conditions and utilizing the first
period time constraint, the Marshallian demand functions are found:
C1(p, y), C2(p, y), and EA(p, y).
So how does the tax on labor income aﬀect the individual’s educational choice?
Consider a marginal increase in the tax rates on labour income and investigate how
these influence the individual’s division of first period time between type-A and
type-B education. The eﬀects on the two kinds of education are symmetrical. Since
we from (1) have that EA + EB = 1, it follows that ∆EB = −∆EA. Hence it is
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suﬃcient to investigate the eﬀect of tax changes on type-A education. The eﬀect of
a tax change on the demand for education is then given by
∂EA
∂ti
=
∂EA
∂pA
· ∂pA∂ti +
∂EA
∂y ·
∂y
∂ti
, i = w, e. (10)
As a response function to a tax change, equation (10) is rather unconventional, since
the income eﬀect enters twice. A tax increase reduces the price of type-A education
as a consumption good. The first element on the right hand side of the equation is
this price eﬀect, which consists of the substitution eﬀect and the income eﬀect of a
tax increase. But type-A education is also an investment alternative, and the tax
reduces the expected return to this investment, measured in expected future wages,
and the second element on the right hand side of (10) is this income eﬀect. Thus
the tax increase aﬀects the individual’s educational choice through two sources; it
changes the value of the individual’s human capital stock, which in turn determines
his income. It also changes the consumption price on education, in which it aﬀects
the relative wage return to the two kinds of education. For this reason the second
income eﬀect enters the individual’s response function.
The first component of the right hand side of (10) reflects how a tax change
aﬀects the price of education as a consumption good. This component consists in
two factors; the first is the price-eﬀect, which shows how a price change alters the
demand for education as a good. The second fraction tells us how much the price
of the educational good A is aﬀected by a tax change. The price-eﬀect consists of a
substitution eﬀect and an income eﬀect. In this specific case, the Slutsky-equation
takes the form13
∂EA
∂pA
=
∂EA
∂pA
|U +
∂EA
∂y · (1−EA) (11)
Total change in the consumption of the educational good A following a price
change is given by the substitution eﬀect pluss the income eﬀect. The substitution
eﬀect states how much a price change aﬀects the individual’s consumption of type-A
education when his income is adjusted such that he may achieve the same utility
level. The price change aﬀects the real income and the purchasing power of the
individual. In turn this aﬀects the achievable consumption bundle of the individual,
and this is the income eﬀect.
A tax change also alters the return to education as an investment alternative,
namely the second period wage. This is represented by the second component of the
13See the Appendix for the deduction of this equation.
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right hand side of (10). Increased income induces the individual to consume more of
all normal goods, including type-A education, ∂EA
∂y
> 0. But increased taxes reduce
total net income, ∂y
∂t
< 0. The total of these two eﬀects predicts a negative value on
the second component of the right hand side of (10).
Combining all this information, the complete eﬀect of a tax change on the indi-
vidual’s educational decision is given by
∂EA
∂ti
=
½
∂EA
∂pA
|U +
∂EA
∂y · (1− EA)
¾
· ∂pA∂ti +
∂EA
∂y ·
∂y
∂ti
, i = w, e. (12)
Symmetry implies that if the individual chooses less type-A education, he chooses
more type-B education. Also, these changes cancel out, such that the total amount
of education is the same. Hence we know that
∂EB
∂ti
= −∂EA∂ti
, i = w, e.
This is the general equation; let us now analyze the two cases i = w and i = e
separately.
3.2 The eﬀect of increased top marginal income tax, te.
The surtax te is levied on the additional wage return e that the individual receives
by choosing type-B education. The eﬀect this surtax has on the individual’s choice
of educational type is found from equation (12) by substituting i = e. From (9) and
(6) we know that
∂pA
∂te
= − e ·H
1 + r
, and
∂y
∂te
= − e ·H
1 + r
.
Applying the above results reduces equation (12) to:
∂EA
∂te
= − e ·H
1 + r
·
½
∂EA
∂pA
|U +
∂EA
∂y (1 +EB)
¾
. (13)
Type A education is a normal good, and the substitution eﬀect of a price increase
is negative. With increased income the individual consumes more of all goods, and
hence the income eﬀect, is positive. The fraction of the individual’s time in the
first period spent on type-B education is equal to or smaller than one, and hence
(1+EB) is larger than one. This tax increase only aﬀects the additional wage return
to the education with negative consumption value, and the basic wage is unaﬀected
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by this. The tax reduces the individual’s disposable income, but at the same time
reduces the price on type-A education as a consumption good. Whether the increased
surtax induces the individual to increase or reduce the amount of type-A education
he chooses depends entirely on which eﬀect dominates, the substitution eﬀect or the
income eﬀect. This is determined by his preferences, and varies among individuals.
If − ∂EA∂pA
|UR
∂EA
∂y (1 +EB) , then
∂EA
∂te
R 0. (14)
If the substitution eﬀect dominates the income eﬀect, the individual’s preference
structure is of such a kind that he puts great emphasis on the consumption value
of type-A education. The tax increase reduces the price on type-A education mea-
sured in foregone wage return by not choosing type-B education, and the individual
changes his educational profile by choosing more of the education with the tax free
consumption return. Then ∂EA
∂te
> 0. The more type-B education the individual has
in his original educational portfolio, the stronger is the income eﬀect. Increased top
marginal tax rate reduces the return to the education with the less advantageous
conditions, and hence the individual chooses less type-B education. This follows
from the symmetry assumption in equation (1). The individual experiences a net
income reduction through two channels; the tax increase and the reduced investment
in type-B education. In order for this to be a sustainable solution, the individual
hence reduces his consumption of the other consumption goods, represented by first
and second period consumption, C1 and C2.
Increased top marginal tax induces the individual to choose less type-A educa-
tion, and more type-B education if the income eﬀect dominates the substitution
eﬀect.
The sign of the eﬀect on the individual’s educational portfolio of an increase in the
surtax depends entirely on the income and substitution eﬀects. But the amplitude
of the eﬀect is partly determined by the fraction e·H
1+r
. The higher the wage return or
the length of the second period are, the higher is the return to type-B education,
and the larger is the eﬀect of an tax increase.
The importance of the discount rate. The higher the discount rate, the more
does the individual value consumption and income in the present, and the less does
he care about the future income when making his educational choice. The present
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consumption value of type-A education matters more for the individual than the
future expected wages, especially since the price, measured in the present value of
future foregone wages, is reduced through this high valuation of the present. A higher
discount rate thus dampens the eﬀect of the tax increase. It also alters the relative
price between ordinary first period consumption, C1, and the education good A.
The higher the interest rate, the more expensive is it to borrow in the financial
market in order to finance first period ordinary consumption, and this reduces the
marginal rate of substitution between type-A education and ordinary first period
consumption. In our model the discount rate is the net of tax real interest rate. A
high tax rate on capital income would thus reduce the discount rate and increase
the relative price on type-A education.
Increased uncertainty of the future has the same eﬀect as an increased discount
rate. If the future wage return to higher education is uncertain, the expected wage
return to type-B education is reduced, and so is the price of type-A education as a
consumption good.
3.3 The eﬀect of increased basic labor income tax, tw.
The tax rate tw is levied on all wage income earned by an educated worker. From
(9) and (6) it follows that
∂pA
∂tw
= − e ·H
1 + r
, and
∂y
∂tw
= − [w + e] ·H
1 + r
.
Applying the above results in equation (12) with i = w yields
∂EA
∂tw
= − H
1 + r
·
½
e · ∂EA∂pA |U + [e · (1 +EB) + w] ·
∂EA
∂y
¾
,
which is equivalent to
∂EA
∂tw
=
∂EA
∂te
− ∂EA∂y ·
w ·H
1 + r
. (15)
As in the previous case, the eﬀect of this increased tax on the composition of the
individual’s educational portfolio depends on the individual’s preference structure.
But, since this tax reduces his disposable income from all sources, and not only the
wage return to type-B education, the income eﬀect is more dominant in this case.
Even if the income eﬀect and substitution eﬀect would cancel out in equation (13),
14
a tax increase would still induce the individual to consume less type-A education in
this case. This is due to the increased importance of the income eﬀect in equation
(15) which appears through the additional fraction on the right hand side of equation
(15), namely −∂EA
∂y
· w·H
1+r
. This fraction is higher the longer the working period and
the wage return to type-B are. The importance of the income eﬀect is somewhat
neutralized by a high discount factor when the individual values consumption today
more than consumption tomorrow.
If the income eﬀect dominates the substitution eﬀect, then the total eﬀect of
an increased basic labor income tax is negative. The reduced income level induces
the individual to reduce consumption of all goods, including type-A education, and
the educational portfolio changes in the direction of less type-A education and more
type-B education. This is also true if the income and substitution eﬀects cancel out.
If the individual has very strong preferences for education as a consumption good,
he might choose more type-A education when the tax increases. In that case the
substitution eﬀect must be so much larger than the income eﬀect as to compensate
for the additional weight put on the income eﬀect through the new fraction on the
right hand side of equation (15).
These are general results. Now consider a specific utility function as described
below, in order to study more closely the importance and sizes of the substitution
and income eﬀects.
3.4 A specific utility function.
Let the utility function be given as the Cobb-Douglas function:
U = α · lnEA + θ · lnC1 + γ · lnC2, (16)
where both first and second period ordinary consumption and type-A education
are normal goods (α > 0, θ > 0, and γ > 0)14. The individual’s lifetime budget
constraint is still given by equation (5). The price on type-A education as a con-
susmption good, pA, and the individual’s full income, y, are defined by (6) and (9).
In this case the individual’s demand function for type-A education is
EA =
y · α
(α+ θ + γ) · pA . (17)
14If α = 0, the model reduces to the pure human capital model where education is a pure
investment alternative and yields no direct consumption value to the individual.
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The individual can at most achieve the utility level V , and evaluated at this point,
the compensated demand function is identical to (17). Thus the substitution eﬀect
is given by
∂EA
∂pA
|U=V = − α · y
(α+ θ + γ) · p2A
, (18)
while the income eﬀect is given by
∂EA
∂y · (1−EA) =
α · (α+ θ + γ) · pA − y · α2
(α+ θ + γ)2 · p2A
. (19)
As it turns out, the substitution eﬀect always dominates the income eﬀect. Thus,
if type-A education had been an ordinary consumption good, the individual would
respond to price increases (decreases) by reducing (increasing) his consumption of
this good, ∂EA
∂pA
< 0. But since it also is an investment alternative, tax changes not
only aﬀect the price on type-A education as a consumption good, but also the return
to it as an investment alternative. Thus the income eﬀect must be included once
more, and this makes the individual’s respond to tax changes more uncertain.
The eﬀect on the educational choice of increased surtax. The eﬀect on an
increase in the top marginal income tax on labor income on an individual with the
previously described preferences is found by combining the equations (13), (18) and
(19):
∂EA
∂te
=
α · {(2 · α+ θ + γ) · (1− tw) · w − [θ + γ] · [(1− tw − te) · e]}
(α+ θ + γ)2 · (1− tw − te)2 · e
. (20)
An increase in the surtax induces the individual to choose more type-A education
and less type-B education if
e
w
<
2 · α+ θ + γ
θ + γ ·
1− tw
1− tw − te
Several factors aﬀect the outcome of an increase in the surtax on the individual’s
educational choice. The more compressed the wage structure, that is, the lower the
expected relative wage return of choosing type-B education over type-A education,
e
w
, the more likely is it that a higher surtax induces him to choose more type-A
education. The income eﬀect is less important the lower the relative wage return to
type-B education is. Also, the after-tax wage structure is more compressed the higher
the surtax is, and this has the same eﬀect as a compressed pre-tax wage structure
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on the individual’s educational choice. The stronger preferences the individual has
for type-A education, the higher is α, and the more likely is it that the individual
responds to an increased surtax by choosing more type-A education.
If the individual chooses more type-A and less type-B education his disposable
income is reduced, and he thus must reduce his ordinary consumption in both pe-
riods. The lower the after-tax wage return to investing in type-B education, the
smaller is the income loss by choosing more type-A education, and the less ordinary
consumption must he forego in order to increase the consumption of the educational
good.
The eﬀect on the educational choice of increased basic labor income tax.
The eﬀect on an increase in the basic labor income tax on the educational choice of
an individual with the previously described preferences is found by combining the
equations (15), (17), (18), and (20):
∂EA
∂tw
=
∂EA
∂te
− αα+ θ + γ ·
1
1− tw − te
· w
e
. (21)
This is positive if
e
w
<
α · (1− tw) + (α+ θ + γ) · te
(θ + γ) · (1− tw − te) .
The higher the surtax, te, and the lower the wage return to type-B educaition, e,
the lower is the price on type-A education as a consumption good. This increases
the probability that the substitution eﬀect dominates the income eﬀect when the
basic labor income tax is increased. The stronger the individual’s preferences for
type-A education (the higher α), and the weaker his preferences for ordinary con-
sumption (the lower θ and γ) the more likely is it that an increased basic labor
income tax induces the individual choose more type-A education and less of both
type-B education and first and second period ordinary consumption. His preferences
for type-A education must be even stronger than required for the substitution eﬀect
to dominate when the surtax is increased.
4 Empirical evidence from Norway.
There has been a 90 percent increase in the number of university graduates in Norway
in the period from 1987 to 2002. Even though the number of science graduates is
17
Figure 1: Annual number of Norwegian university graduates by subject, indexed,
1987=100.
Source: Statistics Norw ay anad ow n calculations.
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more or less stable over the period, each year a smaller share of the students choose
science as their field of study. In 1987 as many as 30.5% of all the graduates were
science or engineering majors, while this share had sunk to 17.4% in 2002. Figure
115 shows the popularity of diﬀerent fields of study over time, and all fields except
science and business increased their popularity over the period.
The average wage diﬀerentials between individuals with low and high education
decreased in Norway16 over the period17, while it increased in USA, as figure 2
shows. Still, more individuals chose to get higher education over the period. Kahn
(1998) finds that the wage setting system in Norway became more centralized in
the late 1980’ies, which lifted the relative wage level of the lower part of the wage
distribution, compressing the wage distribution over the period.
15The figure shows all university graduates, independent of level of the degree. Bear in mind
that the figure shows graduated students each year, who made their educational choice 4-6 years
prior to graduation, depending on the type of degree completed.
16It is worth noting though, that a great share of the highly educated individuals work in the
public sector, where wages are lower than in the private sector, due to the oligopoly power of the
public sector as employer.
17OECD: Education at a Glance has over some years presented average wage diﬀerentials between
four groups of the labor force: Below upper secondary education, Upper secondary education
(=100), Non-university tertiary education, and University education. Figure 2 shows the index
point diﬀerences between individuals with below upper secondary education and individuals with
university education.
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Figure 2: Income inequality between the labor force participants with the highest and
the lowest educational level, men age 25-64.
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Figure 3: Top marginal tax rates on wage income in Norway 1984-2003.
Calculated by Kirsten Hansen, Statistics Norway
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All Scandinavian countries have a tradition for having high taxes and high mar-
ginal tax rates on labor in order to finance their large public sectors. Even so, the
marginal tax rate on wage income decreased in Norway in the 1980’ies, and were
stabilized around 50 % in the 1992 tax reform18. As figure 3 shows, it later increased
to 55,3%. High marginal tax rates makes it more expensive to increase the after-tax
income of high-income individuals in centralized wage bargaining, and this serves as
a disciplinary factor in the wage negotiations and may lead to a more compressed
wage structure19.
As a country gets richer and the income level of the inhabitants increases, they
wish to increase their consumption of all normal goods, including education. It
is natural to expect that they put more weight on the consumption value of the
18Which was a base broadening, rate cutting reform, where the dual income tax with its sepa-
ration of capital income and labor income was introduced.
19For an overview on the empirical literature on this issue, see Sørensen (1997).
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Figure 4: Annual GDP growth rates and unemployment rates in Norway, 1979-2002.
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diﬀerent educational types when making their educational choice, and that they
would choose more of the educational types with the higher consumption value. From
1990 to 1997, GDP per capita increased by 30% in Norway, and the country had the
highest labor force participation rate (84.4%) in the OECD in 1997, after years of
decreasing unemployment. Then one can assume that the individuals choosing field
of would care less about the future job possibilities from choosing a particular field
of study, and more about how demanding and enjoyable the type of education is.
There is a lag here, since individuals choose educational type based on their present
expectancy of future wages, and the situation may have changed a great deal until
they graduate, such that the actual wage return to their chosen field of study can
diﬀer substantially from their expectations. Another important factor here is that
Norway has a well developed welfare state with a wide range of benefit programs for
unemployed and low income individuals. Hence the importance of the probability
of future employment or unemployment in diﬀerent fields of study is less significant
than in countries with a smaller safety net provided by the state.
High marginal tax rates and a compressed wage structure have the same eﬀect;
they both reduce the wage diﬀerentials in the economy. Thus the price of the edu-
cational types with the higher consumption value (type-A education in the model)
decreases, measured in the foregone wage return by not choosing the educational
types generating higher wage return (type-B education in the model). The uni-
versity sector is highly subsidized in Norway and the students face no tuition fees
(unless at the private institutions, which are few), and all students are entitled to
publicly provided and subsidized student loans. Thus the Norwegian student does
not face the actual costs of the higher education, and he in practice faces no credit
20
Figure 5: Net of taxes lifetime income for diﬀerent educational groups relative to the
reference group with only high school. Norwegian males and females, 1980 and 1990,
2% and 5% discount rates.
Type of education Years after 
high school 
 
1980 
(2%) 
1980 
(5%) 
1990 
(2%) 
1990 
(5%) 
Medical school 6 1.43 1.34 1.3 1.19 
Law school 6 1.24 1.15 1.33 1.23 
MA engineering 5 1.22 1.15 1.23 1.15 
MA science 5 1.15 1.07 1.12 1.03 
Business school 4 1.1 1.09 1.42 1.34 
BA science 3.5 1.1 1.06 1.09 1.03 
BA social science 4 1.08 1.01 1.02 0.96 
MA humanities 6 1.08 1.01 0.94 0.87 
High school  0 1 1 1 1 
BA humanities  4 0.96 0.91 0.93 0.89 
Teacher's college 4 0.95 0.92 0.89 0.85 
Nursing school  3 0.88 0.86 0.87 0.85 
      
Source: Moen and Semmingsen (1996) 
 
constraints. Also, the wage diﬀerentials between diﬀerent kinds of education are
small. Figure 5 shows that the net of taxes life time income of the highly skilled
relative to the individuals with only high school all decreased over the period, with
the exception of law school and business school. Medical school, law school, Business
school, and Master of engineering all have restricted admission and very high num-
bers of applicants each year, and these are the educational types with the higher life
time income relative to high school. These types of education are also considered to
require a great deal of eﬀort to complete.
One would expect the Norwegian student to weigh the consumption value of
education heavily when making his educational choice. To some extent this devel-
opment seem to have taken place. Even though the wage return to humanities and
teacher’s college both are smaller than the wage return to finishing the education at
high school level, an increasing amount of individuals choose this line of study20, as
is seen from figure 1.
The theory model applied in the analysis of the paper describes the extreme case
where each type of education has either high or low consumption value and high or
low expected wage return. The educational choice is there described as a trade-oﬀ
20This raises the question of whether the educational market is able to distribute talent in the
optimal mannner; do the best skilled individuals choose the more demanding types of education?
See Klette and Møen (2002) for a discussion of this issue.
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between type-A and type-B education. But since diﬀerent individuals have diﬀerent
preferences, some will get the higher consumption value, as well as the higher wage,
from type-B education, and will thus choose that education independent of the tax
system and the compression in the wage system. Apparently some individuals still
have higher consumption value from some types of education that generate very low
or negative wage return, as seen from the figures 1 and 5. Based on these two figures,
one possible organization of the educational types following the theory chapter would
be the following:
Type-R: Medical school, Law School, and Business School.
Type-B: Master of Science and Engineering
Type-A: Bachelor of humanities, teacher’s college, and nursing school.
The individuals choose education type according to their preferences, which in
the theoretical model are assumed to be exogenous. But the preferences for type of
education are endogenous, and might change as the individual’s understanding of
his own abilities and interests changes. For instance would one expect the individual
to take account of his success probability in the diﬀerent educational directions and
professions when making his educational choice. To some extent the individual’s
preferences for education are shaped during primary school, and very much aﬀected
by his view of what is interesting or not. In this process, the qualifications and
motivation of the teachers are crucial. The decline in the proportion of students
choosing natural science can be seen in connection with the rapid decline of qualified
mathematics teachers during the last 20 years. In 1997, more than 70 % of the older
Norwegian high school teachers had a master’s degree, and more than 20 % of all
the older teachers had a master of natural sciences21. At the same time, only 20 %
of the younger high school teachers had a master’s degree, and only a couple percent
of all the young teachers had a master’s of natural sciences. Poor teaching and lower
level of mathematics skills among the students increases the comprehension that
natural science is a diﬃcult field of study which the students wish to avoid when
possible. This could also be a reason for the observed decline in the share of students
majoring in science.
21Source: Klette and Møen (2002).
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5 Conclusion.
Economists have thoroughly discussed how the tax system might aﬀect the individ-
ual’s educational level. But the question of how the tax system aﬀects the individual’s
choice of educational type has been mostly ignored. This is an important question,
since the educational choice of today’s young generation determines the skill com-
position of tomorrow’s labor force and hence the future production possibilities of
the country. This paper studies this problem in a simple partial model. Depending
on the individual’s preferences, a progressive tax system might in fact introduce
distortions in the individuals’s educational choice and induce him to choose more of
the educational type with the higher consumption value. If he also puts more weight
on the present than on the future, this eﬀect is strengthened further. Empirical ev-
idence from Norway indicates that individuals value the non-pecuniary return to
educational types, and that many are willing to forego future wage return in order
to enjoy the educational types with higher consumption value.
The theoretical analysis was done in a partial model. Since so many eﬀects are
present side by side with the consumption motive in the educational choice, it is not
possible to draw a uniform policy conclusion from this analysis. The main purpose
of this paper has been to shed some light on an ignored eﬀect in the literature
on taxes, namely the eﬀect on the relative price of diﬀerent types of education as
consumption goods. A natural extension of this model would be to analyze how
the presence of uniform and diﬀerentiated tuition fees would aﬀect the educational
choice of the individual in the presence of taxation when education is considered to
be a consumption good.
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7 Mathematical appendix.
Equation (5): By combining the equations (3) and (4), we get:
C1 +
C2
1 + r
= D +
[1− tw] · w · EA ·H + [1− tw] · w · EB ·H
1 + r
+
[1− tw − te] · e · EB ·H − (1 + r) ·D
1 + r
⇓
C1 +
C2
1 + r
=
[1− tw] · w · EA + [1− tw] · w ·EB + [1− tw − te] · e ·EB
1 + r
·H
⇓ EA +EB = 1
C1 +
C2
1 + r
=
[1− tw] · w + [1− tw − te] · e ·EB
1 + r
·H
⇓ EB = 1− EA
C1 +
C2
1 + r
=
[1− tw] · w + [1− tw − te] · e− [1− tw − te] · e · EA
1 + r
·H
⇓
C1 +
1
1 + r
· C2 + [1− tw − te] · e ·H
1 + r
·EA = [1− tw] · [w + e]− te · e
1 + r
·H
The first order conditions :
L = U(C1, C2, EA)
−λ
µ
C1 +
C2
1 + r
+
[1− tw − te] eH
1 + r
EA −
[1− tw] · [w + e]− te · e
1 + r
·H
¶
where λ is the marginal utility of income, which is positive.
.
∂L
∂C1
= U1 − λ = 0,
.
∂L
∂C2
= U2 −
λ
1 + r
= 0
.
∂L
∂EA
= UA −
λ [1− tw − te] · e ·H
1 + r
= UA − λpA = 0
Finding the Slutsky-equation (11): By substituting for the demand functions
in the consumer’s utility function, we find the indirect utility function, V (p, y). This
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is a scalar, and it expresses the highest achievable utility level at the given budget
restriction:
V (p, y) ≡ U(C1(p, y), C2(p, y), EA(p, y)) ≡ U(C1, C2, EA)
It is also the minimum utility level in the dual problem, namely the consumer’s
expenditure minimization problem:
min
x
p · [C1, C2, EA] given that U(C1, C2, EA) ≥ V (p, y).
The Lagrange function of this problem looks as follows:
L = p1C1 + p2C2 + pAEA − ϕ(U(C1, C2, EA)− V (p, y)),
with first order conditions:
∂L
∂C1
= p1 − ϕU1 = 0 (22)
.
∂L
∂C2
= p2 − ϕU2 = 0 (23)
.
∂L
∂EA
= pA − ϕUA = 0 (24)
Manipulating equations (22)-(24), we find the demand functions and insert them
into the consumer’s budget restriction (5). The result is the consumer’s expenditure
function, c(p, V ).
c(p, V ) ≡
n
min
x
p · [C1, C2, EA], U(C1, C2, EA) ≥ V (p, y)
o
. (25)
Since expenditure minimization is equivalent with utility maximization, we get
c(−→p , V ) = y. (26)
The expenditure function is concave in the prices. By Shepard’s Lemma, the Hicksian
demand functions are found by diﬀerentiating the expenditure function:
hi(p, V ) =
∂c(p, V )
∂pi
, i = 1, 2, EA. (27)
The total eﬀect of a price change on the demand of type A education is found by
diﬀerentiating the Marshallian demand function, EA = EA(p, y) when non-labor
income µ is held constant:
∂EA
∂pA
|µ= ∂EA∂pA |y +
∂EA
∂y .
∂y
∂pA
. (28)
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From the expenditure function and the Marshallian demand function it follows that
EA = EA(p, c(p, V )) = hE(p, V ) (29)
The substitution eﬀect of a price change is found by diﬀerentiating (29) with regard
to the price of type A education:
∂EA
∂pA
|U≡
∂eA
∂y
∂c
∂pA
+
∂EA
∂pA
|y≡ ∂hE∂pA (30)
From (27) and (29) it follows that
∂c
∂pA
= EA,
which means that ∂EA
∂y
EA is the income eﬀect. If education is a normal good, this
eﬀect is positive. By substituting equation (30) and (??) into equation (28), we find
the complete Slutsky equation:
∂EA
∂pA
|µ= ∂EA∂pA |U +
∂EA
∂y (1−EA)
Non-labor income is not present in our model, and hence µ = 0 and constant. The
above equation then simplifies to equation (11):
∂EA
∂pA
=
∂EA
∂pA
|U +
∂EA
∂y (1−EA) .
Developing equation (13): From (9) and (6) we have that
y =
[1− tw] · [w + e]− te · e
1 + r
·H
and
pA =
[1− tw − te] · e ·H
1 + r
.
Using i = e in equation (12) yields the following:
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∂EA
∂te
=
µ
∂EA
∂pA
|U +
∂EA
∂y (1−EA)
¶
∂pA
∂te
+
∂EA
∂y
∂y
∂te
↓
⇓ ∂pA∂te
= − e ·H
1 + r
,
∂y
∂te
= − e ·H
1 + r
↓
∂EA
∂te
= −
µ
∂EA
∂pA
|U +
∂EA
∂y (1− EA)
¶
· e ·H
1 + r
− ∂EA∂y ·
e ·H
1 + r
⇓
∂EA
∂te
= − e ·H
1 + r
·
µ
∂EA
∂pA
|U +
∂EA
∂y (2−EA)
¶
.
m EA +EB = 1
∂EA
∂te
= − e ·H
1 + r
·
µ
∂EA
∂pA
|U +
∂EA
∂y (1 +EB)
¶
.
Developing equation (15): From (9) and (6) we have that
y =
[1− tw] · [w + e]− te · e
1 + r
·H
and
pA =
[1− tw − te] · e ·H
1 + r
.
Using i = l in equation (12) yields the following:
∂EA
∂tw
=
µ
∂EA
∂pA
|U +
∂EA
∂y (1−EA)
¶
∂pA
∂tw
+
∂EA
∂y
∂y
∂tw
↓
⇓ ∂pA∂tw
= − e ·H
1 + r
, and
∂y
∂tw
= − [w + e] ·H
1 + r
↓
∂EA
∂tw
= −
µ
∂EA
∂pA
|U +
∂EA
∂y (1−EA)
¶
· e ·H
1 + r
− ∂EA∂y ·
[w + e] ·H
1 + r
⇓
∂EA
∂tw
= −∂EA∂pA
|U ·
e ·H
1 + r
− ∂EA∂y ·
µ
(1−EA) · e ·H
1 + r
+
(w + e) ·H
1 + r
¶
EA +EB = 1
∂EA
∂tw
= − e ·H
1 + r
· ∂EA∂pA |U −
∂EA
∂y ·
w + e · (1 +EB)
1 + r
·H
↓
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∂EA
∂tw
= − e ·H
1 + r
·
µ
∂EA
∂pA
|U +
∂EA
∂y · (1 +EB)
¶
− ∂EA∂y ·
w ·H
1 + r
↓
∂EA
∂tw
= − e ·H
1 + r
·
µ
∂EA
∂pA
|U +
∂EA
∂y · (1 +EB)
¶
− ∂EA∂y ·
w ·H
1 + r
↓
∂EA
∂tw
=
∂EA
∂te
− ∂EA∂y ·
w ·H
1 + r
Developing the demand function (17): The individual maximizes his utility
given that his budget constraint binds, and the Lagrange function is then
$ = α · lnEA + θ · lnC1 + γ · lnC2 − λ ·
·
C1 +
1
1 + r
· C2 + pA · EA − y
¸
whith the corresponding first order conditions
∂$
∂C1
=
θ
C1
− λ = 0 =⇒ λ = θ
C1
(31)
.
∂$
∂C1
=
γ
C2
− λ
1 + r
= 0 =⇒ C2 = C1 · γ · (1 + r)θ (32)
.
∂$
∂EA
=
α
EA
− λ · pA = 0 =⇒ EA = C1 · αθ · pA (33)
.
∂$
∂λ = −
·
C1 +
1
1 + r
· C2 + pA ·EA − y
¸
= 0 (34)
The marshallian demand functions are found by combining the first order conditions.
From (34) it follows that
C1 = y −
1
1 + r
· C2 − pA · EA
⇓ (32) and (33)
C1 = y −
1
1 + r
· C1 · γ · (1 + r)θ − pA · C1 ·
α
θ · pA
⇓
C1 ·
h
1 +
γ
θ +
α
θ
i
= y
⇓
C1 = y · θα+ θ + γ
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Applying this expression in (33) yields
EA = C1 · αθ · pA = y ·
θ
α+ θ + γ ·
α
θ · pA
⇓
EA =
y · α
(α+ θ + γ) · pA
∂EA
∂pA
=
−α · y · (α+ θ + γ)
(α+ θ + γ)2 · p2A
⇓
∂EA
∂pA
= − α · y
(α+ θ + γ) · p2A
∂EA
∂y =
α
(α+ θ + γ) · pA
∂EA
∂y · (1−EA) =
α · (α+ θ + γ) · pA − y · α2
(α+ θ + γ)2 · p2A
The substitution eﬀect dominates the income eﬀect if
− α · y
(α+ θ + γ) · p2A
+
α · (α+ θ + γ) · pA − y · α2
(α+ θ + γ)2 · p2A
< 0
(α+ θ + γ) · y > (α+ θ + γ) · pA − y · α
⇓
2α+ θ + γ
α+ θ + γ >
pA
y
⇓
2α+ θ + γ
α+ θ + γ >
(1−tw−te)e·H
1+r
(1−tw)w+(1−tw−te)e
1+r
·H =
(1− tw − te)e
(1− tw)w + (1− tw − te)e
2α+θ+γ
α+θ+γ
> 1, and (1−tw−te)e
(1−tw)w+(1−tw−te)e < 1, thus the above inequality holds, and the
substitution eﬀect always dominates the income eﬀect in this case.
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Developing (20):
∂EA
∂te
= − e ·H
1 + r
·
½
∂EA
∂pA
|U +
∂EA
∂y (2− EA)
¾
.
⇓ 2−EA = 2−
y · α
(α+ θ + γ) · pA =
2 (α+ θ + γ) · pA − y · α
(α+ θ + γ) · pA
.
∂EA
∂te
= − e ·H
1 + r
·
½
− α · y
(α+ θ + γ) · p2A
+
α
(α+ θ + γ) · pA ·
2 (α+ θ + γ) · pA − y · α
(α+ θ + γ) · pA
¾
↓
∂EA
∂te
=
α · e ·H
(1 + r) · (α+ θ + γ)2 · p2A
· {y · (α+ θ + γ)− 2 (α+ θ + γ) · pA + y · α}
↓
∂EA
∂te
=
α · e ·H
(1 + r) · (α+ θ + γ)2 · p2A
· {y · (2 · α+ θ + γ)− 2 (α+ θ + γ) · pA}
Inserting the values for pA and y yield
∂EA
∂te
=
α · e ·H
(1 + r) · (α+ θ + γ)2 · p2A
·
(
(1−tw)w+(1−tw−te)e
1+r
·H · (2 · α+ θ + γ)
−2 (α+ θ + γ) · (1−tw−te)·e·H
1+r
)
↓
∂EA
∂te
=
α · e ·H2 ·
(
[(1− tw)w + (1− tw − te)e] · (2 · α+ θ + γ)
−2 (α+ θ + γ) · [(1− tw − te)e]
)
(1 + r)2 · (α+ θ + γ)2 · p2A
↓
∂EA
∂te
=
α · {(2 · α+ θ + γ) · (1− tw) · w − [θ + γ] · [(1− tw − te) · e]}
(α+ θ + γ)2 · (1− tw − te)2 · e
That is, an increased top income tax induces the individual to choose more type-A
education and less type-B education if
(2 · α+ θ + γ) · (1− tw) · w − [θ + γ] · [(1− tw − te) · e] > 0
↓
e
w
<
2 · α+ θ + γ
θ + γ ·
1− tw
1− tw − te
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Developing (21):
∂EA
∂tw
=
∂EA
∂te
− ∂EA∂y ·
w ·H
1 + r
=
∂EA
∂te
− αα+ θ + γ ·
1
1− tw − te
· w
e
↓
=
α · e ·H · {y · (2 · α+ θ + γ)− 2 (α+ θ + γ) · pA}
(1 + r) · (α+ θ + γ)2 · p2A
− α
(α+ θ + γ) · pA ·
w ·H
1 + r
↓
=
α ·H ·
(
e · y · (2 · α+ θ + γ)− e · 2 (α+ θ + γ) · pA
− (α+ θ + γ) · pA · w
)
(1 + r) · (α+ θ + γ)2 · p2A
=
α ·H ·
(
e · y · (2 · α+ θ + γ)
− [2 · e+ w] · (α+ θ + γ) · pA
)
(1 + r) · (α+ θ + γ)2 · p2A
↓
=
α ·
(
(2 · α+ θ + γ) · {(1− tw)w + (1− tw − te)e}
− (α+ θ + γ) · (2e+ w) · (1− tw − te)
)
(α+ θ + γ)2 · (1− tw − te)2 · e
∂EA
∂tw
> 0 if
↓
(2 · α+ θ + γ) ·
(
(1− tw)w
+(1− tw − te)e
)
> (α+ θ + γ) · (2e+ w) · (1− tw − te)
↓(
(2 · α+ θ + γ) · (1− tw) · w
+e · (2 · α+ θ + γ) · (1− tw − te)
)
>
(
2e · (α+ θ + γ) · (1− tw − te)
+w · (α+ θ + γ) · (1− tw − te)
)
↓(
(2 · α+ θ + γ) · (1− tw)
− (α+ θ + γ) · (1− tw − te)
)
· w >
(
2 · (α+ θ + γ) · (1− tw − te)
− (2 · α+ θ + γ) · (1− tw − te)
)
· e
↓
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(2 · α+ θ + γ) · (1− tw)− (α+ θ + γ) · (1− tw − te)
2 · (α+ θ + γ) · (1− tw − te)− (2 · α+ θ + γ) · (1− tw − te) >
e
w
↓
(2 · α+ θ + γ) · (1− tw)− (α+ θ + γ) · (1− tw − te)
(θ + γ) · (1− tw − te) >
e
w
↓
α · (1− tw) + (α+ θ + γ) · te
(θ + γ) · (1− tw − te) >
e
w
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